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Assessing the EU’s Strategic 
Partnerships in the UN System 
Thomas Renard & Bas Hooijmaaijers 
In  this  Security  Policy  Brief,  Thomas 
Renard and Bas Hooijmaaijers look at the 
relationship  between  the  EU  and  its  ten 
strategic  partners  in  the  UN  system, 
focussing on the UNGA, the UN Security 
Council  and  the  DPKO.  Part  of  their 
analysis  is  based  upon  statistical  data 
retrieved from UN databases. 
The  EU  has  ten  strategic  partnerships  with 
third  countries:  Brazil,  Canada,  China,  India, 
Japan,  Mexico,  Russia,  South  Africa,  South 
Korea  and  the  United  States.  These  strategic 
partnerships should constitute an effective tool 
for  the  EU  to  pursue  its  interests  globally, 
preferably  in  a  multilateral  framework  but 
relying  on  its  bilateral  relationships.  Yet,  the 
EU’s  strategic  partnerships  are  regularly 
criticized for their lack of implementation. This 
Security Policy Brief assesses their effectiveness in 
the  UN  system,  focussing  on  three  central 
institutions:  the  UN  General  Assembly 
(UNGA), the UN Security Council (UNSC) and 
the  UN  Department  of  Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO). 
 
In the General Assembly 
Our data show that over the 2004-2009 period 
there  was  no  sign  of  increasing  consensus 
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between the EU and its strategic partners in 
the  UN  General  Assembly,  based  on  an 
analysis of their voting patterns (see Chart 1 in 
appendix). If anything, the trend seems to be 
one of (insignificant) decrease. Canada, Japan 
and South Korea – the EU’s “natural allies” – 
have the higher voting cohesion with the EU 
among the ten strategic partners, as they cast 
identical votes 80 to 90 percent of the time. 
Brazil,  Mexico,  Russia  and  South  Africa  – a  
group of countries including “pivotal partners” 
and  “regional  partners”  –  feature  a  voting 
cohesion with the EU ranging from 60 to 70 
percent, a significantly lower cohesion than the 
previous set of partners but still above the 50 
percent threshold. China and India – two key 
“pivotal  partners”  –  voted  against  the  EU 
almost every other time during the 2004-2009 
period, suggesting a diverging view on world 
affairs  between  the  EU  and  the  two  Asian 
emerging powers. Finally, the US – the EU’s 
“essential  partner”  –  had  the  lowest  voting 
cohesion with the EU among the ten partners, 
although  it  significantly  increased  in  2009 
(which  could  be  related  to  the  election  of 
Barack  Obama,  although  this  remains  to  be 
confirmed). 
 
To look at the voting cohesion between the 
EU  and  its  strategic  partners  from  another 
angle, it is possible to distinguish three broad 
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categories  of  resolutions  voted  upon: 
development and human rights issues; conflict 
resolution issues; and security issues.  
 
On development and human rights issues (see 
Chart 2 in appendix), the cohesion with Canada, 
Japan and South Korea is very high. For all the 
other  seven  partners,  however,  the  voting 
cohesion significantly drops to levels around 50 
percent  or  less,  notably  for  the  BRICS 
countries  (Brazil,  Russia,  India,  China  and 
South  Africa).  The  trend  in  voting  cohesion 
between  the  EU  and  the  BRICS  countries  is 
clearly one of decrease. This finding confirms 
the trend that had been observed previously by 
Richard  Gowan  and  Franziska  Brantner. 
Focussing  on  human  rights  issues,  they 
described a trend where “the EU increasingly 
votes as one but the rest of the world has not 
followed; support for the EU positions at the 
UN is steadily decreasing”.
1 Moreover, when it 
comes to the point of agenda-setting they state 
that  on  human  rights  issues  “the  UN  is 
increasingly being shaped by China, Russia and 
their allies”.
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On  conflict  resolution  issues  (see  Chart  3  in 
appendix)  –  mainly  limited  to  the  Israeli-
Palestinian  conflict  – t here  was  remarkably  a 
full voting cohesion between the EU and Japan 
for  the  entire  researched  period  and  a  full 
cohesion with South Korea except in 2009. The 
cohesion  with  Brazil,  China,  India,  Mexico, 
Russia and South Africa was very high as well, 
at  80  percent  or  more.  In  contrast,  cohesion 
with the US is almost inexistent throughout the 
period. Finally, the cohesion with Canada has 
been  significantly  decreasing  over  the  2004-
2009  period.  This  finding  seems  to  confirm 
previous  research,  which  showed  a  very  high 
level of voting cohesion between the EU and 
Canada and Japan regarding Middle East issues, 
a relatively high level of cohesion with its other 
strategic partners (notably Brazil, China, India 
and Mexico), and no cohesion at all with the 
US.
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On  security  issues  (see  Chart  4  in  appendix), 
Canada casted an identical vote with the EU 
almost every time, whereas the US has moved 
significantly closer to the EU in recent years, 
rising from the last position in 2007 and 2008 
(at around 30 percent) to the second position 
in 2009, possibly a consequence of a change in 
the  US  administration.  Most  of  the  other 
partners  have  maintained  a  relatively  steady 
voting pattern vis-à-vis the EU at a relatively 
high level (between 60 and 80 percent), with 
the notable exception of India, which remains 
below the 50 percent threshold, whereas China 
remains  around  the  60  percent  level,  below 
most  other  strategic  partners.  This  finding 
seems  to  challenge  somewhat  previous 
research,  which  found  much  less  cohesion 
between the EU and its strategic partners on 
security issues (notably Brazil, China, Mexico 
and Russia).
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Our  data  suggest  that  the  process  of 
establishing  a  strategic  partnership  had  no 
visible impact on the voting patterns within the 
UNGA. Indeed, during the 2004-2009 period, 
voting  cohesion  between  the  EU  and  its 
strategic partners remained stable at best or at 
times even decreased. Among the partners, the 
status of “natural allies” of Canada, Japan and 
South Korea was confirmed by a large voting 
cohesion, whereas the “essential partnership” 
with the US can be questioned in light of the 
very  low  voting  cohesion  with  the  EU. 
Regarding the other strategic partners, voting 
cohesion  varies  from  one  issue  to  another, 
although  China  and  India  –  two  key  rising 
powers – tend to vote less in line with the EU. 
 
Of  course,  only  limited  conclusions  can  be 
drawn  from  such  quantitative  analysis.  First, 
the  researched  period  is  relatively  limited, 
although the findings were generally coherent 
with  previous  research.  Second  and  more 
importantly,  only  a  limited  amount  of  issues 
are  voted  upon  within  the  UNGA,  meaning 
that the statistical sample is very limited, but 
also that there are many key resolutions that   3 
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fall outside the scope of this research. Indeed, 
only a minority of roughly 20 to 30 percent of 
the resolutions is voted upon. An example of 
an  important  resolution  that  passed  without 
vote  is  the  United  Nations  Global  Counter-
Terrorism  Strategy,  which  was  adopted  in 
September  2006  and  readopted  in  2008  and 
2010. Third, such analysis might overlook the 
fact  that  cohesion  between  the  EU  and  its 
partners  is  part  of  a  much  broader  cohesion 
among  UN  members,  hence  diminishing  the 
meaning  of  strategic  partnerships  in  this 
cohesion.  Fourth,  most  sensitive  issues  are 
discussed outside the UNGA. 
 
Another problem is that this research focuses 
on voting cohesion in case of EU unanimity, 
i.e. the EU voting as one group, which further 
diminishes  the  number  of  researched 
resolutions. Although the EU voting cohesion 
has steadily increased over time, EU unanimity 
still  occurs  in  only  70  percent  of  the  votes. 
However, it should be added that many times 
full  cohesion  is  only  broken  by  one  or  two 
Member States, and that cases of fundamental 
EU disagreement are purely fictional (e.g. a 50 
percent voting cohesion). A broadening of the 
dataset  to  include  cases  where  the  EU  voted 
“almost” as one (i.e. a 90 percent majority or 
more) does not trigger fundamentally different 
findings. If anything, such broadening suggests 
an  even  lower  voting  cohesion  with  some 
partners, notably with Russia and the US. 
 
The fact that EU Member States do not always 
vote as one raises some questions on intra-EU 
coordination, and it is surely an easy argument 
for the EU’s strategic partners to question the 
strategic  actorness  of  the  EU.  Now,  it  could  be 
argued that a (quasi-) full member status for the 
EU  as  such  in  the  UNGA,  in  line  with  the 
competences  of  the  EU,  could  facilitate  the 
EU’s  internal  coordination  (not  the  least 
because this would force the EU to discuss the 
UNGA  agenda  more  regularly  in  Brussels  to 
reach  common  positions)  but  it  could  also 
reinforce  the  EU’s  visibility  and  actorness  in 
the UN. It is therefore regrettable that the vote 
on  the  resolution  introduced  in  September 
2010 to upgrade the EU’s status in line with its 
new competences was postponed, notably due 
to the vote – or abstention – of six of the EU’s 
ten strategic partners. 
 
In the Security Council 
The  Security  Council  is  the  UN  body  where 
most  important  decisions  are  taken  and  is 
therefore  a  place  for  potential  clashes  of 
interest between the EU and its partners. It is 
also an exclusive group limited to 15 countries 
only. This means that a quantitative analysis is 
not possible for not all EU Member States and 
not  all  strategic  partners  are  members  of  the 
Security Council. Two Member States (France 
and  UK)  and  three  strategic  partners  (China, 
Russia  and  the  US)  are  permanent  members 
with  a  special  veto  power.  Among  the  other 
strategic  partners,  Brazil  and  Japan  were  the 
most often elected countries (10 times) in the 
UNSC,  whereas  South  Africa  (2)  and  South 
Korea (1) were the least often elected partners. 
 
Previous  studies  on  the  effectiveness  of  the 
UNSC have shown that regular disagreements 
among  the  Security  Council’s  members  and 
particularly among the P5 have prevented the 
UNSC  from  dealing  effectively  with  many 
pressing  international  issues.
5  The  crisis  in 
Libya  and  the  vote  for  a  UN  resolution  was 
another recent illustration of diverging interests 
and  priorities  between  European  countries 
(France and the UK in this case) and some of 
its strategic partners (the BRIC countries) who 
abstained,  although  remarkably  China  and 
Russia  decided  not  to  veto  it  either.
6 O t h e r  
major  clashes  in  the  UNSC  in  recent  history 
include the 2003 Iraq war, or the 2008 Kosovo 
declaration of independence. Arguably, the use 
of the veto power constitutes the most visible 
expression of a clash between the EU and its 
partners, although such use is very rare (much 
more  exceptional  than  during  the  Cold  War) 
for most sensitive issues are generally avoided   4 
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to eschew a public veto. However, when vetoes 
do occur, they have always opposed the EU and 
some of its strategic partners (see Table 1) in the 
2004-2009 period. 
An additional problem is that clashes of interests 
and  priorities  are  not  only  limited  to  an 
opposition between the EU and its partners, but 
they also divide Europe itself sometimes. Again, 
the  recent  vote  on  Libya  directly  opposed 
Germany  to  France  and  the  UK,  who  had 
introduced the resolution. In the past, European 
countries have also famously clashed over Iraq 
or  on  the  occasion  of  discussions  on  UNSC 
reform, opposing notably Germany and Italy. A 
divided Europe, particularly in the UNSC, is a 
major challenge to the EU’s strategic actorness – for 
itself (i.e. to safeguard European interests) but 
also in the eyes of its strategic partners.  
 
With  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  the  EU  now  has  the 
opportunity to directly address the UNSC via its 
Head  of  delegation  or  via  its  High 
Representative.  Although Catherine Ashton has 
already used her capacity to address the UNSC, 
she  purposely  kept  a  low  profile  during  her 
interventions. Yet, this innovation entails a lot of 
potential for the common foreign and security 
policy,  notably  the  possibility  for  the  EU  to 
provide  direction  (set  the  EU’s  interests  and 
priorities)  whereas  the  Member  States  can 
provide the political backing and the means – 
soft or hard – to pursue the EU’s interests. This, 
of  course,  would  be  possible  if  there  were 
clearly  identified  interests  and  priorities  – 
which  is  unfortunately  not  the  case.  In  the 
absence of such direction for the EU foreign 
policy, it seems rather difficult for European 
members  of  the  UNSC  to  strictly  abide  by 
Article  34  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty  stating  that 
“Member  States  which  are  members  of  the 
Security Council will, in the execution of their 
functions,  defend  the  positions  and  the 
interests of the Union”. The opposition over 
Libya between France and the UK on the one 
hand,  and  Germany  on  the  other  hand 
illustrates the current limits of Article 34. 
 
In Peacekeeping Operations 
UN  peacekeeping  operations  are  another 
framework  where  the  EU  and  its  strategic 
partners  have  the  possibility  to  work 
constructively together (see Table 2 in appendix). 
In  Lebanon,  for  instance,  Europeans  (5050) 
work alongside Indians (899), South Koreans 
(369)  and  Chinese  (344)  in  the  UNIFIL 
mission. Yet the level of involvement within 
UN peacekeeping operations varies from one 
partner to another and barely reflects any form 
of strategic partnership. In terms of staff, for 
instance,  India  is  the  biggest  contributor, 
whereas  China  and  Brazil  have  significantly 
increased  their  contributions  in  the  recent 
years but not yet to similar levels. European 
Member States contribute a big chunk as well, 
Year   Veto by UNSC P-5 member  UNSC resolution subject 
2004  USA  Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
2004  Russia  Cyprus 
2004  USA  Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
2006  USA  Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
2006  USA  Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
2007  China and Russia jointly  Myanmar 
2008  China and Russia jointly  Zimbabwe 
2009  Russia  Georgia and Abkhazia 
 
Table 1: Vetoes in the UNSC (2004-2009) 
Source: www.globalpolicy.org   5 
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with over 7000 men and women. On the other 
hand, countries like Japan, Mexico, Russia or the 
US  contribute  little  to  the  staffing  of  UN 
peacekeeping operations.  
 
While China is the largest contributor among the 
P5, India is the EU’s strategic partner that is the 
largest  personnel  contributor  to  peacekeeping 
operations  overall.  Although  India  is  a 
significant contributor to these operations, it is 
also  a  “receiver”  of  peacekeeping  troops,  as 
there is a peacekeeping mission deployed on its 
own territory, in Jammu and Kashmir. In 2007, 
Russia,  another  BRIC  country,  decided  to 
increase  its  personnel  contribution  to  UN 
peacekeeping  missions  to  a  level  that  suits  its 
international  status,  according  to  the  Kremlin. 
Despite  this  declaration  of  intent,  the  Russian 
contribution  remains  limited  to  257  men  and 
women. 
 
The  EU’s  personnel  contribution  to  UN-led 
peacekeeping  operations  has  been  steadily 
decreasing in the last years, although it has also 
launched its own missions (CSDP) under a UN 
mandate. Nonetheless, the EU remains a major 
contributor  to  UN  peacekeeping  operations  in 
terms of troops. 
 
Do  the  EU  and  its  strategic  partners  deploy 
troops  in  the  same  places?  The  EU’s  most 
comprehensive strategic partner in peacekeeping 
operations  is  China,  as  they  deploy  alongside 
each other in 11 missions in total. India, Russia 
and South Korea share personnel contributions 
with  the  EU  in  nine  UN  peacekeeping 
operations,  and  Brazil  and  Canada  share  the 
burden  in  eight  missions.  South  Africa,  Japan 
and the USA deployed personnel in respectively 
two, four and six UN peacekeeping missions. It 
should  be  noted  here  that  a  country’s 
contribution  to  a  peacekeeping  operation  can 
vary  from  only  a  few  policemen  to  several 
hundreds or thousands of troops. Moreover, the 
EU  and  some  of  its  strategic  partners  have 
launched their own missions, outside the DPKO 
framework,  where  they  can  as  well  deploy 
alongside each other or not, as illustrated by 
the maritime operations in the Gulf of Aden. 
 
Financial  contributions  to  UN  peacekeeping 
operations are a different story. Europe tops 
the  chart,  covering  over  40%  of  the  total 
budget,  and  the  US  almost  30%.  Japan  is 
another  important  financial  contributor, 
although its contribution to the total budget in 
relative  terms  diminished  by  over  35%  over 
the  last  six  years.  All  the  other  partners  are 
very  small  contributors,  China  covering  for 
instance less than 4% of the total budget and 
India  0.1%.  As  the  EU  and  all  its  partners 
recognise the legitimacy of the UN, one would 
expect that a true strategic partnership would 
translate  into  greater  cooperation  and 
involvement  in  peacekeeping  operations  yet 
practice shows otherwise. 
 
The  EU  and  its  strategic  partners  share  the 
burden  of  peacekeeping  unequally.  The 
establishment  of  strategic  partnerships  does 
not  seem  to  have  altered  this  reality. 
Nonetheless, peacekeeping is one area where 
more  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  its 
partners  is  not  only  desirable,  but  also 
possible. This calls for more coordination at 
the  political  level  between  the  EU  and  its 
partners (where to launch new missions?) and 
more  cooperation  on  the  ground  (not  only 
deploying  troops  alongside  each  other  but 
effectively cooperating together – within the 
UN framework or not). This calls also for a 
greater burden-sharing between the EU and its 
partners,  who  would  significantly  improve 
their  international  image  as  a  result  of  a 
further  cooperation  in  the  field  of 
peacekeeping. 
 
Conclusion 
A rapid overview of the relations between the 
EU and its strategic partners in the UN system 
– focusing on the UNGA, the UNSC and the 
DPKO  – s u g g e s t s  t h a t  cooperation  is  still 
limited.  The  establishment  of  a  strategic   6 
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partnership between the EU and a third country 
does not seem yet to have an impact on bilateral 
cooperation  within  the  UN  system.  On  some 
issues, cooperation seems to become even more 
problematic as emerging powers are increasingly 
able  and  willing  to  shape  the  UN  agenda, 
although  they  have  simultaneously  displayed 
signs  of  responsible  behaviour  such  as  on  the 
vote over Libya; it remains unclear whether such 
behaviour will become the rule or an exception. 
The future only will tell whether the relationship 
between the EU and the emerging powers will 
be cooperative or confrontational. However, to 
put  all  chances  on  the  EU’s  side,  strategic 
partnerships  should  become  an  instrument  to 
move  towards  a  cooperative  future.  Our  data 
and  other  studies  suggest  that  the  strategic 
partnerships  are  still  rhetorical  façades  and 
remain  short  of  implementation.
7  Time  has 
come to put strategy into the EU’s partnerships. 
 
On the other hand, time has also come to re-
think  the  EU’s  approach  to  international 
relations. Indeed, the EU itself is often perceived 
as  the  weak  end  of  the  strategic  partnerships. 
Looking at the world from Washington, Beijing, 
New Delhi, or Moscow, the strategic value of 
the  EU  can  be  questioned.  A  cable  recently 
released  by  Wikileaks  quotes  an  Indian  official 
saying  that  the  EU  is  too  “obvious,  shabby, 
shortsighted, full of contradictions, naïve, overly 
pro-active,  and  possessing  a  tendency  to  go 
overboard when it comes to delicate issues”.
8 As 
a matter of fact, several strategic partners have 
proven better at dividing Europe than at acting 
strategically  alongside  Europe  to  tackle  global 
challenges.
9 To be frank, Europeans have very 
often rendered their task easy. 
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APPENDIX 
Chart 1: Voting cohesion between the EU and its strategic partners in the UNGA (2004-2009) 
Chart 2: Voting cohesion between the EU and its strategic partners on Development and Human Rights 
issues in the UNGA (2004-2009) 
Source: Data retrieved from www.unbisnet.un.org 
Source: Data retrieved from www.unbisnet.un.org   8 
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Chart 3: Voting cohesion between the EU and its strategic partners on Conflict Resolution issues in the 
UNGA (2004-2009) 
Chart 4: Voting cohesion between the EU and its strategic partners on Security issues in the UNGA (2004-
2009) 
Source: Data retrieved from www.unbisnet.un.org 
Source: Data retrieved from www.unbisnet.un.org   9 
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